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PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
While every investment, domestic or foreign, entails com-
mercial and political risks, the risks of international investment,
particularly in developing countries, are generally greater and
more complex than those for domestic investments. Of course,
some commercial risks are greater in international investments.
For example, it is often more difficult to obtain information on
the creditworthiness of a foreign purchaser than a domestic pur-
chaser. On the whole, however, the commercial risk of both do-
mestic and foreign investments can often be calculated with
some degree of precision. Experts can anticipate likely changes
in transportation costs, for example, and foreign currencies can
usually be hedged to minimize transfer exposure.
The political risks of international investment, on the other
hand, particularly in developing countries, are generally without
parallel in a domestic environment. For domestic investments,
there is often a so-called "regulatory risk"' that the government
will change the rules of the game in a way that will adversely
affect the economics of the investment. However, the nature of
this risk is only roughly similar to foreign political risk. In the
United States and other industrialized countries, there are com-
prehensive and tested laws that permit an investor to make a
reasoned judgment as to regulatory risks, and there are legal
structures and impartial judiciaries to resolve disputes in accor-
dance with those laws. This is usually not the case for real politi-
cal risks, particularly in developing countries.
Therefore, investors and lenders often seek to obtain insur-
ance against the political and commercial risks of foreign trans-
actions. This article analyzes the types of insurance that may be
available. First, it outlines the elements of political and commer-
cial risks and U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) risk insurance. Then it deals with insurance available
from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
and the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), and other gov-
ernment-sponsored and private political risk insurers. Finally, it
provides tips for negotiating and drafting the three documents
1. See e.g., Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 666 P.2d
329 (1983).
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POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE
crucial to insurance coverage: the underlying investment con-
tract, the application for insurance, and the insurance contract
itself.
II. ELEMENTS OF RISK
A. Political Risk
Political risk itself has not changed much in several millen-
nia. There are sovereigns that have a certain number of rights
and usually a greater number of powers which can be exercised
within their jurisdictions. However, the evaluation of political
risk and the application of that evaluation to business decisions
as well as operations have changed considerably in recent years.2
Many large multinational companies even have in-house manag-
ers of political risk, often as a part of the treasurer's office, but
sometimes as a separate insurance department.-
The evaluation of political risk has also developed theoreti-
cal underpinnings. Scholars and business people have evolved
models by which to evaluate the nature, likelihood and serious-
ness of political risks. Basically, the best-known models require
potential investors to identify and attach values to specific fac-
tors that can affect an investment. At a minimum, these models
can be useful in focusing management's attention on special
risks. However, at some point, the models become subjective.'
For example, the numerical value that is attached to a particular
risk in a political risk equation reflects its significance to the in-
vestor, although reasonable people may differ. Perhaps as a re-
sult of this subjectivity, experience indicates that evaluation of
political risk is treated by most managers more as an art than a
science. One writer has indicated that even managers who have
models available for evaluating political risks often do not actu-
2. See CHARLES M. NEWMAN II & JAMES CZECHOWICZ, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGE-
MENT EXPERIENCES AND PRACTICES (Financial Executives Research Foundation 1983);
FARIBORZ GHADAR ET AL., MANAGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK: STRATEGIES AND
TECHNIQUES (Ghadar and Assoc. 1983).
3. Daniel A. Sharp, Business Environment Assessment, in GHADAR, supra note 2, at
7.
4. Stephen J. Kobrin, Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration, 10 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 67 (Spring/Summer 1979); Alan C. Shaprio, Managing Political Risk: A Policy
Approach, 16 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 63 (Fall 1981); YAIR AHARONI, THE FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT DECISION PROCESS (Harvard Univ. 1966); Sharp, supra note 3, at 7.
19931
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ally use the models when making decisions.'
B. Three Basic Categories of Political Risk
A foreign investor faces three basic categories of political
risks:
1. The risk that political violence, such as war, revolution,
insurrection, terrorism or civil strife will occur. These are events
over which the host government often has relatively little con-
trol. The host government has relatively limited responsibility
under international law for resulting losses to foreign investors,
unless those acts that are not actually committed by the state
can nevertheless be attributed to the state;'
2. The risk that the host government will undertake delib-
erate acts, including expropriation and interference with con-
tractual rights, that will result in the effective taking of the in-
vestor's property rights. These are events over which, almost by
definition, the host government does have control and is gener-
ally responsible under international law for resulting losses to
foreign investors;7 and
3. The risk that the host government will restrict the con-
version of local currency into foreign exchange. This is an event
over which the host government usually has a great deal of con-
trol, but it has relatively little responsibility under international
law for resulting losses to foreign investors.8
5. FRANK, POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE SURVEY: ANALYSIS OF MARKET RESULTS (Univ.
City Science Ctr., Phila., July 7, 1973); Sharp, supra note 3, at 16.
6. See, e.g., Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10)
at 59, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 30, U.N.
Doc, A/CN. 4/Ser. A/1980/Add. 1; Acts of a "Puppet State" or of Local de Facto Gov-
ernment, 8 Whiteman DIGEST § 12, at 835-36; Lena Goldfields (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 5 Ann.
Dig. 3, 426 (1924-30) (Award of Sept. 2, 1930); (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 82, 86 (1926)
(government failed to punish its own nationals who engaged in acts against the personal
safety of foreigners).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)] §188 cmt. b, (1965); see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (2d ed., 1970); Sixth Report by F. V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur on
Responsibility of the State For Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Prop-
erty of Aliens - Reparation of the Injury, 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 37-47, 51, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1961/Add.l.; Letter from Secretary Hull to the Mexican Ambassador
(Aug. 22, 1938), reprinted in Property Rights, 3 Hackworth DIGEST §288, at 655-65.
8. See, e.g., Lighthouse Arbitration (France v. Greece), 23 Int'l L. Rep. 341 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1956); Taxation, 4 Moore DIGEST §540, at 20; Burns H. Weston, "Constructive
[Vol. 5:59
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The risks related to political violence and exchange restric-
tions are relatively straightforward, but the types of deliberate
acts of the host government that may cause losses to foreign in-
vestors require some elaboration.
C. Deliberate Acts of the Government
The host government may engage in acts that present a
range of political and commercial risks to the foreign investor.
First, a host government can nationalize the investment. Out-
right nationalization is obviously a political act undertaken by a
host government in the exercise of its sovereign power. The
United States and other industrialized countries take the view
that nationalization is lawful only if it: (1) is undertaken for a
public purpose; (2) is not arbitrary or discriminatory; and (3) is
promptly, adequately and effectively compensated. Many devel-
oping countries have more expansive views of what a govern-
ment can lawfully do and more restrictive views of what an ex-
propriating government has to pay as compensation.'
Second, a host government can regulate or tax a foreign in-
vestment. Regulation and taxation are political acts in the sense
that they are undertaken for policy reasons by a host govern-
ment in the exercise of its sovereign power. Regulation and taxa-
tion are presumptively lawful exercises of the police power in-
herent in a sovereign (a power of which many states, including
the United States, regularly avail themselves) even if they de-
prive the investor of substantial rights in, or control of, the in-
vestment or of the return on the investment.
Takings" under International Law; A Modest Foray into the Problem of "Creeping Ex-
propriation", 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1975).
9. The position of the developing countries is based primarily on nonbinding resolu-
tions of the United Nations General Assembly, settlements at less than full compensa-
tion, and the views of a minority of scholars. United Nations resolutions are not sources
of international law themselves and are not evidence of changes in custom and practice,
particularly since the actual practice of States in various investment treaties adheres to
the traditional standard. Settlements are, almost by definition, not sources of law, but
decisions to resolve disputes outside the law. Only scholarly opinions are a possible
source of international law, and, I submit, not nearly enough to overcome an accepted
international standard. See e.g., Chorzow Factory (Merits), p. 128 P.C.I.J., (ser. A), No.
17; Texas Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya (Merits), Jan. 19,
1977, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1976); Libya African Oil Co. v. Libya (Merits), April 12, 1977, 20
I.L.M. 1 (1981); L.C.J. Stat. art. 38.
1993]
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Third, a host government can breach, or cause a govern-
ment-controlled entity to breach an agreement with an investor.
Such breaches can be either political or commercial acts depend-
ing upon a number of factors.
Finally, the host government can act, or cause a govern-
ment-controlled entity to act in a commercial capacity as a
shareholder, director, manager or creditor of an investment, and
by such commercial' acts deprive the investor of substantial
rights in, or control of its investment or of its return on its in-
vestment. It is becoming increasingly common for governments
or government-controlled entities to participate in commercial
ventures. 10 So long as the government is legally entitled to act as
a commercial participant, such acts should be deemed to be
commercial, not political acts, even if they result in a loss to the
investor.
D. Definition of an Expropriatory Act
The most obvious political risk is that of expropriation.
Typically, an expropriatory act is defined as an unlawful act of a
government, or on behalf of a government, that results in the
effective taking of all or substantially all of the investor's prop-
erty rights in its investment. This general definition may vary
from contract to contract, and the definition of an expropriatory
act is often heavily negotiated in insurance contracts between
private investors and insurers.
However, it should also be noted that a taking need not be
labeled as such to be an expropriation under international law.
An expropriation need not be explicitly embodied in a nationali-
zation decree. It can be a constructive expropriation as well.1
Similarly, an expropriation need not be the result of a single
event. A series of events that result in substantial loss of an in-
vestor's rights in an investment can amount to an expropriation.
This is called a "creeping" expropriation. 12
10. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C: § 1603 (1988).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 192 Illus. 1, at 572 (1965); see ARGHYRIOS A.
FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 34 n.12, (1962); see Louis B.
Sohn and R.R. Baxter, Responsibilities of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests
of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545 (1961).
12. OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, reprinted in
G.W. Haight, International Organizations OECD Resolution on the Protection of For-
[Vol. 5:59
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E. Commercial/Political Distinction in Deliberate Acts of
Government
1. Deliberate Acts
In the real world, acts by a government do not easily and
clearly fall within only one of the four categories. Particularly,
distinctions between political and commercial acts can be diffi-
cult to determine. Any commercial act can have political ele-
ments. It is especially academic to try to distinguish commercial
from political acts in non-market economies. The failure of a
government-controlled or regulated entity to deliver supplies, for
example, could be a commercial failure or a deliberate political
act.
In principle, the distinction is made more difficult because
the motivation of a government, even if discernible, is not rele-
vant. A government is responsible under international law for its
acts and its effects, not for its intentions.13 However, in a dis-
pute over whether an act is commercial or political, the govern-
ment's expression of its intentions can be a decisive factor in the
determination of whether an act is genuinely regulatory or
expropriatory."
The distinction between commercial and political acts, al-
though difficult, is often crucial to the assessment of risk. A
company should be able to judge in a reasonably effective man-
ner the likelihood and effect of lawful regulatory or commercial
acts. For example, it should know that tax rates can change and
be expected to evaluate in advance the effect that such changes
can have on the economics of an investment. More importantly,
the distinction between commercial and political acts is often
crucial to insurance coverage because certain types of insurance
are only available to cover political risks, not commercial risks.
eign Property, 2 INT'L LAW 326, 331 (1968).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 192 (1965); "Harvard Draft Convention on the Inter-
national Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens," reprinted in Sohn & Baxter,
supra note 11, at 548, 553.
14. See Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
Am. Arb. Assoc. Case No. 16 10 0137 76 (1978) (Bergan, Arb.).
1993]
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F. Elements Of Commercial Risk
Commercial risks vary with the four commercial stages of an
investment: (1) planning and development, (2) construction, (3)
start-up of operations, and (4) operations.
1. Planning And Development
The investor has relatively small financial exposure in the
planning and development stage itself. However, there are a
number of risks that must be addressed so that they will not
adversely affect the investment at a later stage. Therefore, it is
at the planning stage that the question of insurance should be
addressed, even though the risks to be insured against arise only
in later stages. For example, insurance is useful, or even neces-
sary, to obtain financing for the construction stage.
In order to identify risks, an international contract will
often provide that the parties will undertake or fund feasibility
studies acceptable to all parties.15 Financial risk for feasibility
studies can be reduced by applying for subsidized funding. Such
funding is available from the World Bank for qualified invest-
ments that are beneficial to developing countries. For U.S. com-
panies, funding may be available from OPIC and the Agency for
International Development for investments in developing coun-
tries that would likely increase United States exports.16 Addi-
tionally, developing countries themselves will sometimes provide
funds or other assistance for feasibility studies.17
2. Construction
Real financial risk for the investor generally begins at the
construction stage. Construction lending is usually with recourse
15. Chinese law might even require that joint ventures produce feasibility studies.
Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures (1979), Art. 9,
reprinted in COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CONCERNING FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (1980) [hereinafter China Joint Venture].
16. Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 2421 (1988); see William A.
Delphos, Washington's Best Kept Secrets (1983), reprinted in INSIDE WASHINGTON: THE
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT RESOURCES (1988).
17. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CORPORATION, INVESTING IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES '(1978); INVESTMENT POLICIES IN SEVENTY-THREE COUNTRIES
(Price Waterhouse, 1982).
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to the investor because lenders normally will not assume the risk
of a failure to complete an investment. The primary risks are
technical ones and the principal commercial exposure is unfore-
seen increases in projected costs. It is possible to reduce these
risks by a well-drafted force majeure '8 clause and by contractual
provisions that take account of any possible delays in
construction.
3. Start-Up of Operations
At the start-up of the operations stage, the principal com-
mercial risk is whether the investment can operate at the costs
and to the specifications made when the investment was fi-
nanced. If it cannot, it is likely that the investment will have to
be restructured in order to produce enough earnings to service
debt, pay expenses and earn a return.
4. Operations
At the final operations stage, the investment revenues
should be sufficient to service debt, pay operating costs and pro-
vide a return to the investors. The principal commercial risks
during the operations stage are:
1. Nondelivery of supplies and raw materials; unforeseen in-
creases in the costs of supplies;
2. Raw materials or additional borrowing;
3. Failures of marketing;
4. Failure to produce goods of sufficient quality or with suffi-
ciently reliable delivery;
5. Insufficient or unreliable demand;
6. Lack of trade financing for purchasers; and
7. Uncollectibility of receivables.19
18. A force majeure clause protects the parties of a contract in the event that a part
of the contract cannot be performed due to causes which are outside the control of the
parties and could not be avoided by exercise of good care.
19. See Goodwillie, Financing for Foreign Sites Projects: Methods of Risk Avoid-
ance, Am. Bar Assoc. Seminar on Counseling the U.S. Multinational (1985).
1993]
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G. Insuring Against Political and Commercial Risks
In principle, one can say with some accuracy that any risk is
insurable if one is prepared to pay the premiums. However, in
practice, not all risks are insurable. Coverage against the basic
political risks described above is available from one or more en-
tities but coverage against many commercial risks is not usually
available. Moreover, special commercial risk coverages are not of
much utility in day-to-day business decisions and operations.
Such coverages are sometimes not available at all, not usually
timely and are almost always expensive.
Therefore, with respect to commercial risk insurance the
question must be: against which commercial risk does the in-
surer offer coverage? It is possible to obtain insurance against:
(1) certain risks of construction, basically property and casualty
coverage for Acts of God but usually only for physical damage,
rather than unforeseen increases in cost caused by Acts of God;
(2) risks of project completion, that is a successful start-up of
operations, involving someone other than the insured; and (3)
certain risks of operation. Insurers are generally prepared to
cover the reliability of a supplier, the creditworthiness of a pur-
chaser, or the collectibility of receivables.20
Insurance for commercial risks of operation is not always
available to cover purely market risks such as cost increases, in-
sufficient demand or risks of technical failures. Insurance for
commercial risks of operations may not be available to cover the
effects of those commercial acts over which the insured has con-
trol. For example, it is unlikely that an investor could obtain
insurance against losses caused by the failure of its own market-
ing or by its own increased borrowing or cost overruns.
III. OPIC
A. Structure
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was
chartered by Congress to provide support for private American
business investment in developing countries. OPIC is a corpora-
20. This subject is discussed further in sections on the United States Export-Import
Bank and private insurance companies, and accompanying footnotes.
[Vol. 5:59
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tion wholly owned by the United States government. Its obliga-
tions are backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States. In 1971, OPIC commenced operations. OPIC insures
against losses caused by expropriatory acts, inconvertibility, as
well as war, revolution, insurrection and civil strife and business
interruptions caused by such. Additionally, OPIC has special in-
surance programs to cover standby letters of credit and perform-
ance bonds.
In 1985 and 1988, Congress amended OPIC's authority in
the following ways:
1. OPIC was authorized to provide a new category of insurance
for losses due to "business interruption.
' '21
2. The maximum contingent insurance liability that OPIC is
permitted to have outstanding to any one investor, usually a
bank, was increased from ten percent to fifteen percent "in or-
der to provide increased flexibility for those entities which have
used investment guarantee programs and which are likely to
reach the ten percent ceiling before 1989. ''22
3. OPIC can operate in a country "only if the country in which
the project is to be undertaken is taking steps to adopt and im-
plement laws that extend internationally recognized worker
rights, as defined in Section 2462(a)(4) of Title 19, to workers in
that country (including any designated zone in that country) un-
less the President determines that such activities [by OPIC]
would be in the national economic interests of the United
States" and reports his determination to Congress.23
4. The ceiling on OPIC's total investment guarantees was raised
from $750 million to $1.5 billion.2"
However, in 1985, Congress rejected two administration re-
quests for changes to OPIC's statutory provisions. Congress re-
fused to exempt OPIC's risk pooling arrangements with OPIC-
like organizations in other countries from certain policy require-
ments in OPIC's authorizing legislation, for example, any project
21. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1)(D) (1988), OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985, HR. CONF. REP. No. 428, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-14 (1985).
22. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(d) (1988); OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985, S. REP. No. 156, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985).
23. 22 U.S.C. § 2191a (a)(3) (1988).
24. OPIC Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-461, Title V, 102 Stat. 2268-21,
(1988).
1993]
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assisted by OPIC must have positive developmental effects on
the host country and have no adverse effects on the United
States economy. The Senate Committee Report underscored its
refusal by noting "that OPIC's primary mission, to foster the
flow of investment to friendly developing countries without
causing injury to the United States, is one which should apply to
whatever activity OPIC undertakes. ' '12 Also, Congress refused
OPIC's request that the definition of "eligible investor" be left
to the discretion of OPIC's board of directors.26
OPIC is a corporation wholly owned by the United States
government. Its obligations are backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States.27
The business and affairs of OPIC are managed by a board of
directors consisting of fifteen members and OPIC's president.28
The chairman of the board is also the Administrator of the
Agency for International Development. The vice chairman is the
Deputy United States Trade Representative. Eight members of
the board appointed by the President and confirmed by the Sen-
ate are from the private sector. The board also has representa-
tives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce and
Labor. 29
B. Scope of OPIC Coverage
It is important to emphasize at the outset that OPIC covers
only political risks, not commercial risks. OPIC's purpose is to
encourage investment by United States companies in developing
countries by providing political risk insurance, loans and loan
guaranties. One principal part of OPIC's operations is its politi-
cal risk insurance, which covers risks of war, revolution, insur-
rection and civil strife, inconvertibility, expropriation and busi-
ness interruptions caused by such. OPIC's expropriation
coverage can also encompass arbitrary drawdowns on bonds, let-
ters of credit and other guarantees of performance, payment,
25. S. REP. No. 156, supra note 22, at 3.
26. Id. at 3-4.
27. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(c) (1988).
28. 22 U.S.C. § 2193(b) (1988).
29. Id.
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etc., if caused by political acts.30
OPIC's coverage is divided into two classifications:
1. The "current insured amount" is the amount of coverage ac-
tually in effect at a given time; and
2. The "standby insured amount" is assurance that OPIC will
provide future coverage, up to the maximum amount specified in
each contract.
OPIC will normally make insurance available for earnings
valued at up to twice the amount of the initial insured invest-
ment. A premium is charged for the outstanding amount of the
investment and related earnings, if any, and in some cases, there
is an additional charge for the differences between coverage lim-
its and the outstanding amount. OPIC can insure an investment
for up to twenty years and coverage of at least fifteen years is
common. During that time, the insurance cannot be cancelled by
OPIC.
For an equity investment, coverage applies to the equity in-
terest. For a loan, coverage applies to scheduled principal and
interest payments. For other types of investments, the specific
assets contributed by the investor, as set forth in the contract,
represent the insurable investment.
C. Eligibility
OPIC is an agency of the United States government, and
there are limitations on investors and investments eligible for
OPIC's programs based upon policy considerations.3 1 The most
significant limitations are described in the following paragraphs.
Eligible investors include United States citizens, entities incor-
porated in the United States if substantially beneficially owned
by United States citizens, and entities incorporated outside the
United States if more than ninety-five percent beneficially
owned by United States citizens or such eligible corporations.2
30. 22 U.S.C. § 2194 (1988).
31. 22 U.S.C. § § 2191, 2197 (1988).
32. 22 U.S.C. § 2198(c) (1988).
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1. Investments
OPIC can provide insurance coverage only for investments
in less developed friendly countries."3 OPIC must give preferen-
tial consideration to investment projects in "less developed
countries" that have average per capita income of $984 or less in
1986 United States dollars, and must restrict its activities with
respect to investment projects in "less developed countries" that
have average per capita income of $4,269 or more in 1986 dol-
lars.3 4 By the end of 1991, OPIC was operating in 122 eligible
countries."8 Until the end of the cold war, Communist countries
were specifically excluded, except where designated by statute."6
Statutory exceptions have been made for Yugoslavia, Poland,
Hungary, other East European countries, and China.-7 OPIC has
subsequently been authorized to operate in the former Soviet
Union and has signed agreements with all members of the for-
mer Soviet Union, except Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, with
which it expects to sign agreements shortly.
2. Additionality
OPIC should assist investments for which the insurance is
"additional."' In principle, OPIC should provide insurance only
if the investment would not proceed without that insurance. In
practice, OPIC satisfies this policy by issuing its insurance only
to investors who register their projects with OPIC prior to enter-
ing into an irrevocable commitment to invest. If investors have
not registered their projects, they might still be eligible for cov-
erage if they can clearly demonstrate that they would not have
entered into the investment without the insurance. For example,
the investment contract might provide that the investment is
33. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
34. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(2) (1988).
35. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter
1991 ANNUAL REPORT].
36. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(a) (1988),
37. 22 U.S.C. § 2199(0 (1988).
38. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988); ARTHUR YOUNG AND CO., STUDY OF ADDITIONALITY OF
OPIC ASSISTANCE TO U.S. PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1982)
[hereinafter ARTHUR YOUNG STUDY OF ADDITIONALITY]. "Additionality" is a bureaucratic
word that, loosely translated, means "necessary."
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contingent upon obtaining insurance from OPIC. 9
3. Eligible Countries
OPIC is required to enter into "satisfactory arrangements"
with a host government before it can offer insurance programs.
Typically, these arrangements take the form of bilateral invest-
ment guarantee agreements. These agreements establish the ba-
sic relationship between OPIC and the host government.40
Among other things, the agreements provide that the host gov-
ernment must specifically approve projects to be insured by
OPIC, that OPIC will be subrogated to the rights of its insureds
and that disputes between OPIC and the host government will
be resolved by international arbitration in accordance with in-
ternational law. OPIC has bilateral agreements with more than
135 developing countries. Almost three-fourths of these bilateral
agreements were entered into by OPIC's predecessor, a division
of the Agency for International Development. 4' For many years,
OPIC was unable to do business in most of Latin America be-
cause many Latin American countries subscribe to the so-called
Calvo Doctrine,'2 the effect of which is to make it impossible to
enter into arrangements for subrogations and arbitration as pro-
vided for in the bilateral agreements.43 OPIC can now do busi-
ness in most Latin American countries."
OPIC is prepared to insure an investment controlled by a
host government only if there is a "high probability" that the
39. This point is discussed further under "Negotiating and Drafting Points," below.
40. OPIC's bilateral agreements are different from the Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs) being negotiated by the United States Department of State. BITs are agreements
that are intended to protect all United States investors. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, 1 BILATERAL TREATIES FOR INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT (1978). By
contrast, OPIC's bilateral agreements are intended to affect directly only the relationship
between OPIC and the host government.
41. See, e.g., Investment Warranties Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Somali Republic, 1964, Effected by Exchange of notes, T.I.A.S. 5512 at
1.
42. A doctrine articulated by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo, it denies a complain-
ant the right to seek diplomatic protection from its home government where doing so
would give the complainant more rights and protections than are afforded to a national
of the host country where the investment is made.
43. See, e.g., Allison, Capital Controls in Latin America, in INT'L FIN. L. 31 (Rendell
ed., 2d ed. 1983).
44. Countries not included are Mexico and Peru.
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project will be commercially viable. This higher standard implies
a presumption that governments are inclined to sponsor invest-
ments for other than commercial reasons.
4. New Development
The investment must be a "new" investment.4 5 However,
this can include the modernization or expansion of existing facil-
ities. Also, it can include acquisitions to "privatize" government-
owned entities and acquisitions from private parties if they are
accompanied by substantial additional investment for improve-
ments or modernization.
5. Loan-to-Value Ratio
OPIC can generally cover only up to ninety percent of an
investment's value, to a maximum of $100 million per project.
There are case-by-case exceptions to the dollar maximum and
OPIC will insure up to one hundred percent of loans by lending
institutions to unrelated parties.46
6. Effects on U.S. Economy
OPIC cannot assist in any investments in "run-away" plants
or in any investments that would result in a significant net loss
of United States jobs. 47 Also, OPIC may not assist in any invest-
ment that involves so-called "performance requirements" that
"would reduce substantially the positive trade benefits likely to
accrue to the United States from the investment."' 8
D. Expropriatory Acts
To constitute an expropriatory act, an act of the govern-
ment must be outside the government's legitimate role as a com-
mercial participant or beyond the scope of its legitimate regula-
tory authority. 9 For certain situations in which the potential
45. ARTHUR YOUNG STUDY OF ADDITIONALITY, supra note 38.
46. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(0 (1988).
47. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(k), 2191(1) (1988).
48. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(m) (1988).
49. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Insurance Contract 234, KGT 12-85
[hereinafter OPIC 12-85 Contract], Art. IV, Section 4.01 of the OPIC contract defines
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difficulty of distinguishing between a commercial and a political
act is inherent, OPIC has revised its expropriation insurance to
cover noncompliance with the dispute resolution provisions of
an agreement.5 0 For example, in China, if the government's per-
vasive involvement would make distinctions between political
and commercial acts particularly difficult, OPIC would compen-
sate an insured investor if a Chinese entity:
1. Fails to participate in the dispute resolution procedure;
2. Participates, but refuses to pay an award or judgment ren-
dered against it under the dispute resolution procedures; or
3. Obtains an award or judgment in its favor by means of fraud,
corruption or coercion, or obtains an award that is not supported
by substantial evidence on the record.51
1. War, Revolution, Insurrection and Civil Strife
For most investors, political violence coverage ' extends to
damage or destruction of physical assets only. For institutional
total expropriation as
an act or series of acts [that] satisfies all of the following requirements:
(a)the acts are attributable to a foreign governing authority which is in de facto
control of the part of the country in which the project is located;
(b)the acts are violations of international law (without regard to the availability of
local remedies) or material breaches of local law;
(c)the acts directly deprive the Investor of fundamental rights in the insured in-
vestment (Rights are fundamental if without them the Investor is substantially
deprived of the benefits of the investment); and
(d)the violations of law are not remedied (§ 9.101.9) and the expropriatory effect
continues for six months.
Expropriation of funds is compensable where (a), (b) and (d) above are met and the
act or series of acts "directly" results in preventing the Investor from (1) repatriating the
funds; and (2) effectively controlling the funds in the country in which the project is
located. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art. IV, Section 4.02.
50. OPIC covers "normal" expropriations (such as nationalizations or overt take-
overs) in any event.
51. OPIC has not done business in China recently because of human rights
violations.
52. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art. VI, Section 6.01 of the OPIC Contract defines politi-
cal violence as:
a violent act undertaken with the primary intent of achieving a political objective,
such as declared or undeclared war, hostile action by national or international
armed forces, civil war, revolution, insurrection, civil strife, terrorism or sabotage..
However, acts undertaken primarily to achieve labor or student objectives are not
covered, compensation will be paid only for permanent losses that are the direct
and immediate result of the political violence.
19931
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lenders and others the coverage also extends to liability for pay-
ments, such as payments for principal and interest on loans or
under technical assistance agreements, when events of war,
revolution, insurrection or civil strife cause a default. However,
OPIC cannot cover defaults on payment obligations of a host
government. OPIC has taken the position that insuring pay-
ments having the full faith and credit of the host government
would, in ,effect, be underwriting the commercial obligations of
that foreign government.
Insurance against civil strife was added relatively recently
to cover events that do not fit within the traditional definitions
of war, revolution or insurrection. Losses due primarily to labor
and student disputes are specifically excluded from civil strife
coverage.5"
2. Inconvertibility
Coverage against inconvertibility 54 of local currency insures
that local currency can be converted into dollars on the terms in
effect at the time the insurance is issued. This is not coverage
against devaluation, which involves the risk that local currency,
although convertible, will be worth less in foreign exchange at
the time of conversion than at the time of investment. Devalua-
tion is deemed a commercial risk, not a political risk.
For OPIC's inconvertibility coverage, an investor must es-
tablish that at the time OPIC's policy was issued it had a legal
right to convert the local currency into dollars. OPIC then in-
sures the continuance of that right. If the right to convert is
abridged after the policy is issued, for example, by the institu-
tion of exchange controls, or is substantially altered to the detri-
ment of the insured, OPIC will transfer dollars to the investor in
exchange for local currency at the prevailing official exchange
53. Id.
54. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art II, Section 2.01 of the OPIC contract provides that
compensation shall be payable
if neither the Investor nor the foreign enterprise is able legally:
(a) to convert earnings from or returns on the insured investment into United
States dollars through any channel during the [specified] days immediately prior
to a claim to OPIC, except at an exchange rate that is less favorable than the
then-prevailing rate described under § 3.01.2, or
(b) to transfer such converted earnings into the United States during such period.
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rate or at the exchange rate available in another legal channel if
there is no official rate.5
Typically, OPIC requires that the inability to convert con-
tinue for a period of time which is specified in the contract, after
applying to the host government's central bank." For countries
in which the ability to convert local currency to foreign exchange
is subject to considerable delay by the central government,
OPIC's insurance, if available at all, will be subject to longer
holding periods. Because of the way the contract is structured,
the insured usually bears the risk of devaluations during the
waiting period.
3. Business Interruptions
Insurance covering business interruptions caused by war,
revolution, insurrection and civil strife, inconvertibility and ex-
propriation was added to the list of OPIC services under the
1985 OPIC amendments. 7
4. Special Insurance Programs
OPIC has special insurance programs to cover standby let-
ters of credit and performance bonds. Typically, these letters of
credit and bonds are "on demand" and can be drawn down for
any reason by the beneficiary which in most cases is the host
government. If the drawing is the result of political acts of the
host country, OPIC's insurance coverage indemnifies the U.S.
company for losses resulting from arbitrary or illegal drawing on
the letter of credit or bond issued as a performance or advance
payment guarantee. OPIC's insurance covers ninety percent of
the guarantee and the term of the policy is generally co-exten-
sive with the guarantee. Coverage is available:
1. If the underlying contract provides for a dispute resolution
procedure, or
2. If local law and practice indicate that the procedure and the
underlying contract would be followed in the event of a dispute
involving a drawing under a guarantee and experience indicates
55. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art. 3.01(2).
56. OPIC 12-85 Contract, Art. 2.01.
57. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1)(D) (1988).
1993]
21
PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW
that the procedure is likely to be fair and impartial.
For bid guarantees, a drawing is deemed to be arbitrary if it
is not justified by the terms of the tender or agreements entered
into with the contractor. For advance payment and performance
guarantees, a drawing is deemed to be arbitrary if: (1) the dis-
pute resolution mechanism in the contract makes an award to
the contractor and the host government does not pay, or (2)
through no fault of the contractor, the tribunal fails to render
any award within a specified time, or (3) the tribunal renders an
award in favor of the host government and the investor can es-
tablish that the award was obtained through fraud, corruption
or is not supported by substantial evidence on the record.
E. Finance Programs
Although political risk insurance traditionally constituted
the bulk of OPIC's operations,58 OPIC also has a growing loan
and loan guarantee authority for investment projects in develop-
ing countries." Direct financing is usually at market or close-to-
market interest rates. Loan amounts generally range from $1
million to $6 million. To be eligible for OPIC's direct loan pro-
gram, a U.S. small business must be a project sponsor.
Loan guarantees, covering both commercial and political
risk, are available to projects involving small and large U.S. com-
panies. They are available to larger U.S. companies for projects
located in higher income developing countries only if the
projects have special benefits, such as promotion of a significant
number of U.S. jobs. Loan guarantees usually range from $6 mil-
lion to $25 million but can reach $50 million for large projects."e
F. Claims
Many investors believe that the mere existence of OPIC's
insurance can deter political interference by a host government
because of the host government's unwillingness to interfere with
58. 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35.
59. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(b), 2194(c) (1988). There is more to say about OPIC's finance
programs, but they are outside the scope of this article.
60. This is a brief description of OPIC's finance programs, which are currently grow-
ing in size and importance and shouid be addressed in more detail, but not in this
article.
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a project "sponsored by the United States government."'
In 1991, OPIC settled three civil strife claims and one expropria-
tion claim with cash payments of $2 million and a guaranty set-
tlement of $30 million.2 OPIC has also successfully negotiated
the resolution, without payment by OPIC, of several potential
expropriation claims. In many instances, these negotiations re-
sulted in higher payments to the investor than the amount
claimed. 3
In its twenty year history from 1971 to 1991, OPIC denied
twenty-two claims, "but only seven have been submitted to arbi-
tration by the investors." OPIC has "paid, guaranteed, or pro-
vided indemnities for more than $510 million to investors in set-
tlement of 242 insurance claims. As of September 30, 1991,
claims pending totaled $5.5 million." '64
IV. MIGA
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
like OPIC, is intended to encourage the flow of foreign private
investment to developing countries by providing political risk in-
surance.6 5 MIGA was created to fill the gaps in "national" insur-
ance programs such as OPIC and those of certain other industri-
alized countries which favor their own nationals and tend to
concentrate on investments in their own regions of the world.66
The convention to establish MIGA was opened for signature in
1985 by the Board of Governors of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank); the MIGA
Convention constituting MIGA as an independent member of
the World Bank group was consummated in 1988.67
61. See West, The Utility of Political Risk Insurance as a Transfer Risk Mecha-
nism, in GHADAR, supra note 2, at 118, 123.
62. 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 4.
63. As a matter of policy, OPIC does not disclose the amount of insurance coverage.
64. OPIC Press Release, Insurance Claims Experience to Date: OPIC and its Pred-
ecessor Agency, Sept. 30, 1991; See also 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35 at 4.
65. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, [here-
inafter MIGA Convention] reprinted in XXIV I.L.M. 1598 (1985); see also Shihata, The
Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency, in PROCEEDINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS
OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, 50 (1985-86).
66. L. WALLACE, FIN. & DEV. 48 (1992).
67. MIGA Operational Regulations, I.L.M. Background/Content Summary, 27
I.L.M. 1227 (1988). MIGA Convention, Art. 61.
1993]
23
PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW
A. Structure and Capitalization
The MIGA Convention entered into force on April 12, 1988
upon ratification by the required minimum of five industrialized
countries (referred to in the MIGA Convention as Category 1
countries) and fifteen developing countries (Category 2 coun-
tries) which were required to subscribe to the required minimum
of one third of MIGA's capital (approximately U.S. $360 mil-
lion). Membership in MIGA is open to all members of the World
Bank.68 To become a member in MIGA each country must ratify
MIGA's Convention, subscribe to a specified amount of capital
and contribute a portion of the capital. 9 A total of 116 countries
have signed the MIGA Convention and 86 have become full
members as of August 7, 1992.
During the first three years after MIGA entered into force,
all decisions of the Board of Directors required a special major-
ity vote consisting of not less than two-thirds of MIGA's total
voting shares representing at least fifty-five percent of its sub-
scribed capital. 0
In effect MIGA required a consensus of developing and in-
dustrialized countries. After the first three years, MIGA was to
review its voting structure with a view to reallocating shares,
presumably resulting in a voting split of about 60/40 in favor of
the Category 1 countries. 1 As of July 1992, MIGA had delayed
such review for two more years.72
The business and affairs of MIGA are directed by a Council
of Governors (one representative of each member), a Board of
Directors (elected by the Council), and a Chief Executive Officer
selected by the Board and responsible for the day-to-day busi-
ness operations. MIGA is an autonomous and self-sufficient in-
68. MIGA Convention, Art. 61. (Switzerland was separately named as eligible for
MIGA membership and subsequently became a member of the World Bank on May 29,
1992).
69. L.P. Hollywood, MIGA and Long-Term Political Risk Insurance for Investment
in Developing Countries, in THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE: ISSUES AND
PRACTICE, No. 63 (17th year), April 1992.
70. MIGA Convention, arts. 3(d), supra note 65, at 39.
71. MIGA Convention, art. 39(c), supra note 65, at 1619; Introductory Note on the
MIGA Convention, in 24 I.L.M. 1598, 1603 [hereinafter Introductory Note].
72. Interview with Christophe Bellinger, MIGA, Washington D.C.
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stitution.73 Its relationship to the World Bank has been de-
scribed as "symbolic, ' 7' although the President of the World
Bank is Ex Officio Chairman of MIGA's Board of Directors and
nominates MIGA's Chief Executive Officer.Y
1. Capitalization
MIGA was initially to have a share capital of one billion
Special Drawing Rights (SDR).76 Subscriptions have to be based
on relative economic strength as measured by the subscribers'
allocation of shares to the capital of the World Bank. MIGA be-
came operational when one third of its total capital was actually
subscribed. Ten percent of the subscription was to be paid in
cash. Another ten percent was to be paid in nonnegotiable, non-
interest bearing promissory notes. The remainder of the sub-
scription was subject to call. Industrialized countries had to pay
in foreign exchange, whereas developing countries could pay up
to twenty-five percent of the cash portion of their subscriptions
in their own currency. 77
B. Programs
MIGA insures against only political, not commercial risks.
At the outset, insurance liabilities could not exceed 150 percent
of the amount of MIGA's subscribed capital plus reserves and a
portion of its reinsurance coverage, or approximately U.S. $1.5
billion. This ratio can now be increased up to a maximum of five
to one. 8
1. Eligibility
Coverage under MIGA is subject to requirements of eligibil-
ity for investors and investments similar to those of OPIC. Eligi-
ble investors include nationals of a member country, entities in-
corporated and having their principal place of business in a
member country and entities having a majority of their shares
73. MIGA Convention, art. 25, supra note 65, at 1617.
74. Shihata, supra note 65, at 53.
75. MIGA Convention, arts. 32(b), 33(b), supra note 65, at 1618, 1619.
76. MIGA Convention, art. 5(a), supra note 65, at 1609.
77. The United States' subscription was $222 million.
78. MIGA Convention, arts. 7, 8, 22, supra note 65, at 1610, 1615.
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owned by nationals of member countries.79 In an unusual provi-
sion, eligible investors also include nationals of the host country
if the assets to be invested are obtained from abroad. This pro-
vision is intended to assist developing countries in reversing cap-
ital flight."0
Investments must be developmental, comply with the laws
of the host country and be consistent with the host govern-
ment's development objectives and priorities.81 Initially, MIGA
insured only equity interests and other forms of direct invest-
ment such as shareholder loans and guarantees. By special ma-
jority vote of MIGA's Board of Directors, coverage can be ex-
tended to other forms of investment including "indirect equity-
type investments," (i.e., management, service contracts and li-
censing agreements).82 In addition, loans by a financial institu-
tion to an unrelated borrower are insurable if MIGA is also cov-
ering a shareholder investment in the project. Certain types of
investments, such as those related to military purposes, cannot
be assisted by MIGA.8"
MIGA can only insure new investments, but eligibility is not
limited to new projects. Like OPIC, it will consider applications
for coverage to be applied to expansion, acquisition and modern-
ization of existing companies."
The host government must approve the investment before
coverage is extended. 5 MIGA can "deem" that an approval has
been obtained if the host government has not objected within a
reasonable period.86 By contrast, OPIC requires specific ap-
proval. A matter that will have to be clarified is whether a fail-
ure to object can successfully be imposed upon a sovereign state
as conclusive of specific approval.8 7
MIGA has the option of seeking an agreement with a host
country concerning treatment of investments that MIGA guar-
79. MIGA Operational Regulations, para. 1.15, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1227 (1988).
80. Introductory Note, supra note 71, 24 I.L.M. at 1600.
81. MIGA Convention, art. 12(d), supra note 65, at 1612.
82. Id. art. 12(b); Hollywood, supra note 69, at 261.
83. Shihata, supra note 65, at 56.
84. Hollywood, supra note 69, at 262.
85. MIGA Convention, art. 15, supra note 65, at 1613.
86. MIGA Convention, art. 38(b), supra note 65, at 1620.
87. See SMIT, GALSTON AND LEVITSKY, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (1981).
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antees. Unlike OPIC, MIGA is required to enter into such an
agreement only if it is not satisfied that the host country can
provide fair and equitable treatment and legal protection for the
investment.88 If entered into, such agreements "will assure that
the Agency... has treatment at least as favorable as that agreed
by the member concerned for the most favorable investment
guarantee agency or state in an agreement related to an
investment." 89
MIGA can only insure new investments but eligibility is not
limited to new projects. Like OPIC, it will consider applications
for coverage to be applied to expansion, acquisition and modern-
ization of existing companies. Additionally, MIGA-assisted in-
vestments must be commercially sound.90 By contrast, OPIC
usually does not require an assessment of the commercial sound-
ness of an investment.9 MIGA, like OPIC, is expected to be self-
sustaining. Rates can vary on the basis of the characteristics of
the project, but not the characteristics of the host country.92
The agency has experienced record results on its investment
programs for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1992. By June 30
MIGA had issued 21 investment insurance contracts with a com-
bined maximum coverage of U.S. $313 million and with a total
of U.S. $504 million written as of that date. In fiscal year 1991,
MIGA had written a total of 11 contracts with maximum cover-
age of U.S. $59 million. 3
2. Coverage
The MIGA Convention provides coverage against four broad
categories of risk:
1. Transfer risk resulting from restrictions on currency conver-
sion and transfer;
2. Risk of loss resulting from legislative or administrative ac-
88. MIGA Convention, art. 23(b), supra note 65, at 1616.
89. OPIC is likely to have the most favored treatment by virtue of its own bilateral
agreements.
90. MIGA Convention, art. 12(d)(i), supra note 65, at 1612.
91. This is not always the case, however, because the political risk attached to a
venture can increase if a venture is not commercially sound.
92. Shihata, supra note 65, at 60.
93. MIGA Press Release, MIGA Guarantees Reach U.S. $500 Million Mark, July 9,
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tions or omissions that have the effect of depriving the investor
of ownership or control or substantial benefits from the invest-
ment (expropriation);
3. Repudiation or breach of government contracts where the in-
vestor has no access to a competent judicial or arbitral forum, or
faces Unreasonable delays or is unable to enforce a judicial or
arbitral decision issued in its favor; and
4. The risk of war and civil disturbance.
A special majority of MIGA's Board of Directors can vote to
cover additional political risks on an ad hoc basis if the investor
and the host country so request."
In the beginning, MIGA envisioned some control and finan-
cial participation by developing countries as well as by industri-
alized countries.95 This has made MIGA more acceptable to de-
veloping countries. However, it could also have created some
potential concern about MIGA's coverage particularly in connec-
tion with events of expropriation or contract repudiation where
the investor and the host government might disagree as to
whether a taking or repudiation could occur or as to its cause.
The MIGA Convention addressed this concern by excluding
from coverage "non-discriminatory measures of general applica-
tion which governments normally take for the purpose of regu-
lating economic activity in their territories." 96 This provision has
been explained as follows:
This exclusion is not meant to confine coverage under that provi-
sion to outright expropriation. The exclusion applies only to host
governmental measures that meet all its requirements, i.e., to
measures that (a) do not discriminate against the investor, (b) are
normally taken by governments, and (c) are taken for the purpose
of regulating economic activities in the host country's territory.
The Commentary on the Convention, which was also approved by
the Bank's Executive Directors, lists as examples of such mea-
sures "taxation, environmental and labor legislation as well as
normal measures for the maintenance of public safety."97
94. MIGA Convention, art. 11(b), supra note 65, at 1612.
95. Shihata, supra note 65, at 53. This is unlike an earlier attempt by the World
Bank to promote a political risk insurance agency.
96. MIGA Convention, art. 11(a)(ii), supra note 65, at 1611.
97. Shihata, supra note 65, at 55 (emphasis in text).
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The same commentator also acknowledged that "[t]he value
of the expropriation coverage will depend largely on MIGA's
ability to cope with the problem of 'creeping expropriation' and
expropriation in the guise of apparently legal measures adopted
by the host government." '98
Interpretation and application of the MIGA Convention are
decided by MIGA's Board of Directors subject to appeal to
MIGA's Council of Governors. 9 Some rules and regulations for
MIGA's operations were originally set at a "Preparatory Confer-
ence" in October 1986; neither the allocation of voting rights nor
the definitions of expropriation and compensation were ad-
dressed at the conference. Operational regulations were adopted
on June 22, 1988100 and eligible risks were defined in the General
Conditions of Guarantee made part of the Standard Contract of
Guarantee adopted January 25, 1989.101
3. Claims
Disputes arising under insurance contracts between MIGA
and its insureds can, but are not required to, be submitted for
arbitration.10 When MIGA pays or agrees to pay a claim, it is to
be subrogated to the rights of the investor. Disputes between
MIGA and the host country arising out of subrogation are nor-
mally settled by negotiation, conciliation and arbitration. 10 3
MIGA is permitted to sell or use local currency obtained in an
inconvertibility settlement if its agreement with the host coun-
try so provides. This is similar to the arrangement that OPIC
has with the United States Department of State.10'
4. Comparisons With National Programs
Compared to national programs such as OPIC, MIGA has
raised some concerns that will have to be addressed before it
becomes completely acceptable to foreign investors.
98. Id. at 54.
99. MIGA Convention, arts. 56, 30, 31, supra note 65, at 1625, 1617.
100. 27 I.L.M. 1227 (1988).
101. 28 I.L.M. 1233 (1989).
102. MIGA Convention, art. 57, supra note 65, at 1626.
103. MIGA Convention, art. 57, Annex II, supra note 65, at.1626, 1631.
104. MIGA Convention, art. 18(c), supra note 65, at 1614.
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First, MIGA's portfolio of business in its first few years is
likely to be relatively small and, by the process of adverse selec-
tion, risky. Even if MIGA reinsures, it is likely to have a rela-
tively small number of investments over which to spread its risk.
This means that the potential risk of a substantial loss will be
high, at least in the early years. This can be expected to result in
high premiums if MIGA is to be self-sustaining. Under these cir-
cumstances, an investor might also have some concern about
MIGA's ability to pay substantial claims during the start-up pe-
riod except by a call upon its members.10 5
Second, it is not clear how MIGA will resolve internally the
potentially troublesome and divisive issues of what constitutes
an expropriatory act and what is fair compensation. 06
On the other hand, MIGA could supplement OPIC and
other national insurance plans, by the following means. First,
MIGA is empowered to cover the risks of war damage to land-
based assets. Such coverage is not generally available in the pri-
vate market. OPIC offers such coverage, but MIGA's entry into
the field might provide some additional volume of coverage and
might also encourage changes in the private market. Second,
MIGA, by virtue of its "symbolic" relationship with the World
Bank, might discourage a host government from interfering with
covered investments. Moreover, MIGA, like OPIC, can assist in-
vestors in obtaining recoveries, conceivably even in excess of
coverage. Finally, MIGA might be more politically acceptable to
a host government as a subrogee of the insured's rights. This
might facilitate work-out arrangements. 10 7
105. MIGA is not underwritten by the World Bank. Shihata, supra note 65, at 52.
106. Payments of claims are decided by the President of MIGA "under the direction
of the Board [of Directors] ... [and] in accordance with the contract of guarantee and
such policies as the Board may adopt." MIGA Convention, art. 17, supra note 65. The
terms and conditions of MIGA's insurance contracts are also subject to the 'rules and
regulation' of the Board of Directors. Id. at art. 16. Except for the first three years, the
Board decided by majority vote. Id. at arts. 39, 42(a). Decisions about contract language
and claims can, therefore, ultimately be made or changed by the Board of Directors,
which will have on it substantial representation from developing countries.
107. Developing countries sometimes resent subrogation to a government. See Al-
lison, supra note 43. Cf. Theodor Meron, The World Bank and Insurance, 47 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L.J. 301, 312 (1974-75); Edward M. Martin, Multilateral Investment Insurance:
the OECD Proposal, 8 HARV. INT'L L.J. 280, 318-319 (1967).
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V. EXIMBANK
It is the policy of most industrialized countries to encourage
their domestic companies to export and, to some extent, to in-
vest in foreign countries.'08 This policy is intended to serve a
number of national interests, such as increasing or protecting
domestic employment, assuring supplies of raw materials or
other important products, gaining access to restricted markets,
and advancing foreign policy objectives.
Most industrialized countries support exports and foreign
investment through various programs. 09 These programs can
also reduce the costs of goods and services for exporters and in-
vestors. The United States supports exports principally by the
Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank)." '
A. Structure And General Coverage
Eximbank is a government corporation. It is managed by a
five member Board of Directors who are appointed by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate, of which not more than three
can be from one political party."'
Eximbank's borrowings and financings are general obliga-
tions of the United States and are therefore backed by its full
faith and credit.'1 2 In addition, although Eximbank receives no
appropriated funds, Congress does establish ceilings on what it
can loan, guarantee, or insure each fiscal year.
108. H.L. WEISBERG AND CHARLES RAUCH, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXPORT INDUS-
TRIES IN THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY AND JAPAN (1979)
[hereinafter WEISBERG].
109. Id. at 26-30. ROBINSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: A COMPRE-
HENSIVE STUDY OF SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRY INVESTMENT PROMOTION PROGRAMS
(1980) [hereinafter ROBINSON]. See also, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS ON EXPORT CREDIT COMPETITION FOR THE PE-
RIOD JANUARY 1, 1984, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1984 (September 1985) [hereinafter Ex-
IMBANK REPORT]; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGETS AND COSTS OF THE EXPORT-
IMPORT BANK LOAN SUBSIDIARY PROGRAM (March 1981) [hereinafter CBO REPORT].
110. 12 U.S.C. § 635a(a) (1988).
111. 12 U.S.C. § 635a(b), (c)(2) (1988).
112. 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 27 (1966).
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B. ECIP
The Eximbank Export Credit Insurance Program (ECIP),
unlike OPIC and MIGA, provides commercial as well as political
risk coverage to exporters and foreign investors. Political risks
covered through ECIP include war, revolution, insurrection, ex-
propriation and inconvertibility of local currency. Commercial
risks covered include the buyer's insolvency or protracted
default.
ECIP has been restructured twice during the last two years.
Prior to 1991, the Foreign Credit Insurance Association
("FCIA"), an association of approximately 50 leading private in-
surance companies, sold and serviced Eximbank export credit
insurance policies. In October 1992, responsibility for adminis-
tration of this program was transferred to FCIA Management
Company, a private contractor. Effective September 1992, the
program has become an in-house controlled operation, but will
continue to offer the same services provided by the private
contractor. 13
Credit insurance is Eximbank's major program for short-
term transactions, which are fewer than 180 days in duration."
This program insures against low foreign sales receivables. ECIP
can insure U.S. exporters against ninety percent of commercial
risk and 100 percent of the political risk associated with the fi-
nanced portion of export sales.11 5 Any entity engaged in export-
ing or the export financing *of U.S. goods is eligible for cover-
age. 6 A bank can purchase a policy directly or the proceeds of a
policy can be assigned to a bank in order to make it possible to
obtain private export credits at lower interest rates.
ECIP's predecessor FCIA insured about three percent of
U.S. exports. Over half of this coverage was provided to
113. See Eximbank Press Guidance; Export Credit Insurance Program, August 13,
1992. Eximbank officials have stated that this return to in-house adminstration is in the
best interest of the program, citing a built-in conflict of interest involving the program's
government guarantee as one reason behind the decision.
114. EXIMBANK REPORT, supra note 109, at 35.
115. ECIP Combined Short-Term/Medium-Term/Comprehensive Policy [hereinaf-
ter ECIP Policy].
116. ECIP will continue to provide the same insurance services as provided by FCIA
Management Company.
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banks."1 7 Eximbank's in-house program will continue to provide
uninterrupted coverage to participating investors and provide
the vehicle for a more efficient and effective marketing effort.
1. Requirements
ECIP covers short and medium-term transactions. Short-
term coverage is available if fifty percent of the value of a trans-
action is of United States origin; medium-term coverage usually
requires 100 percent United States origin.
Certain conditions must be met on all exports covered by
medium-term insurance. Initially, the foreign buyer must make
a cash payment of at least fifteen percent of the contract price
on or before delivery. The U.S. exporter must then retain at
least ten percent of the risk of the financed portion of each
transaction (that is, the contract price less any cash payments).
Furthermore, repayment terms cannot exceed those customary
in international trade for the goods covered, although the term
will vary with the contract value. Higher contract values are eli-
gible for longer terms of up to five years.
Premiums will vary with the repayment terms and with as-
sociated commercial and political risks. ECIP claims must gen-
erally be filed within 120 days after the date of default. Amounts
received after payment of a claim, and after payment of ECIP's
collection expenses, are shared between the insured and ECIP in
the ratio in which they apportioned the loss.
2. Multi-Buyer Programs"8
ECIP's multi-buyer programs assist U.S. exporters doing
business with many buyers on a continuous basis. The programs
allow a degree of flexibility to the exporter. ECIP offers short-
term (up to 180 days) and medium-term (up to five years) multi-
buyer policies. These policies cover both commercial and politi-
cal risks. ECIP also offers policies that cover only political risks.
The multi-buyer policies usually include discretionary credit
limits (commonly up to $200,000), which allow the exporter to
117. CBO REPORT, supra note 109, at 11.
118. The First National Bank of Chicago, National Export Credit Program (1985)
(internal material).
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obtain coverage automatically on certain individual transactions
without referring the transactions for separate approval by
Eximbank.
ECIP relies to a great extent on the insured to check the
creditworthiness of foreign buyers covered by multi-buyer poli-
cies. In order to encourage the insured to exercise sound credit
judgment within the discretionary limits, ECIP's coverage for
commercial risk requires that ten percent of the risk be retained
by the insured.119 Sales above the discretionary credit limit re-
quire ECIP's approval. Such policies normally have an annual
commercial first loss deductible, similar to that in automobile
insurance, which does not, however, apply to losses resulting
from political, as contrasted to commercial, events. Multi-buyer
policies can cover up to ninety percent of the commercial risk
and up to 100 percent of the political risk.
These policies are generally written for a one-year period
and cover sales to end-users, dealers or distributors. 12 0 The ac-
tual percentage of coverage for a specific transaction can be
lower, depending upon Eximbank's assessment of commercial
and political risks.
3. Single-Buyer Programs
ECIP offers three programs to insure exports to a single
buyer (generally on medium-term repayment periods) of capital
goods or goods having relatively high unit values. These three
programs are called the medium-term single sale policy, the me-
dium-term repetitive policy, and the combined short-term/me-
dium-term policy. The buyer must make a minimum down pay-
ment of fifteen percent on all three policies.
Under the medium-term single sale policy, coverage applies
to a single specified sale. The insured can make separate ship-
ments during a specific period. This period is usually six
months, although the period can be extended. Typically, each
separate shipment must be covered by a separate promissory
note issued by the buyer, but ECIP will also cover multiple ship-
119. Id. Financing banks are often expected to share with the exporter up to one
half of the uninsured risk for supplier credits.
120. Id. In the political risk-only policies, ECIP is prepared to cover up to 200 per-
cent of political risk.
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ments on a single promissory note.
The medium-term repetitive policy offers the same coverage
as the medium-term single sale policy but applies to goods
shipped to a single buyer (usually a dealer or distributor) over a
specific renewable period (usually one year).
The combined short-term/medium-term policy covers capi-
-tal goods on terms similar to those of other policies, as well as
parts and accessories for up to 180 days. It can also finance in-
ventories related to exports of capital goods for up to 270 days.
At the end of the period, the policyholder can convert the short-
term obligation into medium-term insurance coverage upon
making a fifteen percent down payment on the cost of the
policy.
C. Letters of Credit
Eximbank has also established insurance coverage for let-
ters of credit issued by banks. Under the policy, which is not
applicable to back-to-back, red clause, conditional or standby
letters of credit: 1. The financing bank can pass more risk expo-
sure along to the exporter; 2. Coverage is the same for both po-
litical and commercial risk;' 3. The waiting period for filing
claims following default is shortened from 180 days to sixty
days; and 4. ECIP is prepared to commit to coverage for ninety
days.
The insured can apply for a credit limit for an issuing bank
so that, within that limit, insurance can be issued for a specific
class of transactions. These transactions include, for example,
those from a particular exporter to a particular importer, or of a
particular product to a particular importer. Transactions can be
in U.S. dollars, pounds sterling, French francs, Deutsche marks,
Swiss francs, or yen.
At least fifty percent of the value of the goods before
markup must be of United States origin. The policy normally
covers payment terms of up to 180 days after presentation. It
can also cover letters of credit used to finance the sale of services
performed by U.S. personnel. For coverage to be effective, the
121. Id. Ninety-five percent for most transactions, ninety-eight percent for sales of
bulk agricultural commodities, and one hundred percent for sovereign obligations.
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issuing bank must accept the documents as those provided for in
the letters of credit.
1. Special Programs
ECIP offers certain specialized programs, including insur-
ance against specific risks during preshipment,1 1 insurance
against political risk for consignment sales,1"3 and insurance for
sales of bulk agricultural commodities sold on the basis of irrev-
ocable letters of credit.
D. Private Export Funding Corporation
The Private Export Funding Corporation (PEFCO) is a pri-
vate company owned by several U.S. commercial banks and cor-
porations. 24 It extends medium-term and long-term loans to
foreign buyers of U.S. capital goods. All PEFCO loans must be
covered by an unconditional guarantee by Eximbank of both
principal and interest. PEFCO raises its loan funds in the pri-
vate capital market, using Eximbank's guarantee. Similarly, Ex-
imbank's approval is required for individual loan commitments
by PEFCO.
PEFCO was organized as a supplementary lending source. It
generally does not make loans of less than $1 million. It makes
loans only when necessary funds are not available from the usual
private sector sources on normal credit terms at competitive in-
terest rates. PEFCO's principal value to the export community
has been its ability to make loans when loans from more tradi-
tional lenders are less readily available, and to make them at
fixed interest rates for longer than normal commitment periods.
VII. OTHER GOVERNMENT SPONSORED AND PRIVATE INSURANCE
Virtually every industrialized country, and a number of de-
veloping countries, including India, have investment insurance
programs similar to those of OPIC. '25 It is difficult to describe
122. Id. This is the period of fabrication of goods for which sales contracts have
been executed, generally for products that cannot easily be sold to another buyer.
123. Id. This is where the exporter retains title until the goods are sold.
124. See, Warren W. Glick and Robert J. McKinsey, The Export-Import Bank of
the United States, in 2 INT'L FIN. L. (Rendell, ed., 2d ed., Euromoney Publications 1983).
125. Weisberg, supra note 108; Robinson, supra note 109.
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what is available in the private political risk insurance market,
because the information is frequently confidential and the mar-
ket is often in flux.
A. Other Government Sponsored Insurance
Some of these government-sponsored insurance programs
are operated by the same agencies that handle export insurance
and credits, a function which Eximbank performs for U.S. ex-
porters. Some of the agencies are administered by private com-
panies, but all of the programs issue political risk insurance with
governmental authority and financial backing.12 6 These agencies
are members of the International Union of Credit and Invest-
ment Insurers (the Berne Union).
Most official investment insurance programs base eligibility
on the company's domicile and its operations in the host coun-
try, rather than, as in OPIC programs, on the nationality of the
company's ownership. In principle, therefore, an investment by a
subsidiary of a U.S. company could be covered under several
programs, so long as the investment has real commercial value
to the insuring country. 12 7 Financing and insurance for exports,
unlike for investments, are generally available from nonofficial
programs without reference to the nationality of the exporter, so
long as the source requirements are met. The crucial test is
whether the exporting country receives benefit.128
Political risk insurance programs offered by other industri-
alized countries are frequently available in more countries and
areas than are OPIC's programs. However, in practice, many
such programs concentrate on developing countries, particularly
former colonies.2 9  Government-to-government agreements,
which are similar to OPIC's bilateral agreements, are rarely re-
quired by other programs.
Most other industrialized countries limit their programs to
new investments. Other programs are not necessarily restricted
126. Cecil Hunt, Government and Private Political Risk Insurance in DOING Busi-
NESS IN HIGH RISK COUNTRIES 6, 8 (1979).
127. Id. at 9-10.
128. See 12 U.S.C. § 635a (1988).
129. See Weisberg, supra note 108, at 8-9; Hunt, supra note 126, at 11.
1993]
37
PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW
to private sector projects.'"
Most political risk insurance programs for investment of-
fered by other industrialized countries require that insured in-
vestments fulfill some policy objectives. These objectives range
from developmental benefits to the host country to exports from
the insuring country.
B. Private Political Risk Insurance
In general, relatively few private insurers directly cover po-
litical risk.13' In covering property and casualty risks, some pri-
vate insurers will, in effect, also cover losses resulting indirectly
from political acts. Coverage for fire damage, for example, will
usually extend to damage caused by acts that are "politically"
motivated. Private political risk insurance is generally not avail-
able for more than three years, although it may be renewed for
additional periods.
1. Companies Active In This Field
The largest U.S. private political risk insurer is probably the
American International Group (AIG). The Political Risk Divi-
sion of AIG was merged in 1984 with five other "agency compa-
nies" to create AIG Specialty Agencies, Inc., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of AIG.132
Lloyds of London, Panfinancial, the Chubb Group of Insur-
ance Companies, and the Continental Corporation, through its
affiliates, Swett & Crawford and Pacific Insurance Company, are
also major political risk insurers. Lloyds works through special
underwriters who accept risks on behalf of individual members
130. Hunt, supra note 126, at 11.
131. See generally CHARLES M. NEWMAN II AND JAMES CZECHOWICZ, INTERNATIONAL
RISK MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCESS AND PRACTICES (Financial Executives Research Foun-
dation 1983), at 139-75; Rober Svensk, The Role of Private Sector Insurance in
FARIBORZ GHADAR ET AL, MANAGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK: STRATEGIES AND
TECHNIQUES (Ghadar and Assoc. 1983), at 114.
132. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, 28-9 (1985). Other
agencies merged with the Political Risk Division include divisions insuring oil and gas
drillings rigs, the transportation industry nonstandard personal automobile risk, kidnap-
ransom and extortion, and special coverage for the entertainment industry. 2 MOODY'S
BANK AND FINANCIAL MANUAL 2924 (1984); 2 MOODY'S BANK AND FINANCIAL MANUAL 2926
(1985).
[Vol. 5:59
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/3
POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE
grouped in one or more of the 350 syndicates now in operation.
Access to Lloyd's underwriters is controlled exclusively by
Lloyd's brokers.
Most political risk insurance on investments, especially
large investments, is negotiated by a few specialized brokers, not
directly with the insured.133 The brokers are legally the agents of
the insured and are valuable for their expertise in keeping
abreast of a changing market.
2. Coverage Available
Private insurance covering a substantial number of foreign
political and commercial risks is generally available. Under ex-
propriation (often referred to as "confiscation, expropriation and
nationalization"), private insurers can cover both new and ex-
isting investments. 3 " Private insurance coverage is also some-
times available against risks of inconvertibility and generally
against the risks of arbitrary drawdowns of on-demand bank
guarantees or bonds. Private political risk coverage is generally
not available against risks of war damage to land-based assets,
for reasons discussed below.' 35
Private insurance is also available against the commercial
risks of contract repudiation by public buyers (not usually by
private buyers), export embargoes, import embargoes and de-
faults of buyers for commercial reasons.1 36 Coverage against
losses caused by defaults for political reasons is available from
private insurers under their standard political risk contracts.
Premiums will vary considerably depending upon the in-
vestment, but tend to be higher than premiums charged by
OPIC and ECIP. Private insurers will often quote premiums as a
single amount for the duration of the coverage, although they
might be payable in periodic installments.' 37
133. See Survey on Insurance and Insurance Brokering, FINANCIAL TIMES, April 16,
1986; Frank, supra note 5; Hunt, supra note 126.
134. OPIC cannot insure existing investments.
135. OPIC does cover such risks. •
136. ECIP offers all such coverage.
137. By contrast, the premiums of OPIC and ECIP are quoted on an annual basis.
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3. Reinsurance
The political risk insurance market is relatively small, but
demand is increasing. In order for political risk insurance to be
commercially viable over time, the portfolio of investments in-
sured must be large and diverse. Otherwise, the insurer runs the
risk of wiping out one or two years' premiums with one major
loss. Most private political risk insurers, therefore, seek to coin-
sure or reinsure some of their risk portfolios.
Reinsurance is a key to the development of the private po-
litical risk industry.13 8 With some important exceptions, the pri-
mary reinsurance market for political risk insurance lies in a few
syndicates associated with Lloyds. The reinsurance market at
Lloyds is complex. Often there may be more than 100 underwrit-
ers on a single large reinsurance project.
The reinsurance market is now a limitation on the develop-
ment of the private political risk insurance industry. Much of
political risk reinsurance evolved out of property and casualty
coverage, as reinsurers moved gradually from covering acts of
God to covering acts of governments. The movement, however,
has been gradual. For example, to date, there is only one private
reinsurance treaty (Panfinance) that appears to cover land-
based assets against war risks.139 The overlap between the politi-
cal risk reinsurance market and the property and casualty rein-
surance market is such that when the property and casualty
market is required to pay a large number of claims, the availa-
bility of political risk reinsurance is often further constrained.
Reinsurance can be by treaty or by project-"facultative"
reinsurance. 14° Facultative reinsurance is done by a single rein-
surer, whereas treaty insurance is done by a group of reinsurers.
Facultative reinsurance includes, almost by definition, a limited
portfolio of investments, whereas treaty reinsurance covers all
investments that fit the requirements of the treaty. As such, fac-
ultative reinsurance is generally more expensive and less reliable
138. See Survey on Reinsurance, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1986; Hunt, supra note 126.
139. By contrast, vessels can be covered for war risks. The theory is that the insur-
ers could, by contract, require an insured vessel to leave a war zone within a reasonable
period. They obviously cannot do so with fixed landbased assets.
140. See e.g., the OPIC Amendments Act of 1985, Sec. 10, and the discussion in S.
Rep. 99-156, supra note 22, at 5-6.
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than treaty reinsurance, which provides the greatest potential
for growth in the political reinsurance industry.
VIII. NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING POINTS
At least three documents are crucial to insurance coverage:
the underlying investment contract, to which the insurer is not a
signatory; the application for insurance; and the insurance con-
tract itself. In negotiating and drafting these documents, inves-
tors or lenders seeking insurance against the political and com-
mercial risks of foreign transactions should consider a number of
points, including provisions that have been important in dis-
putes between insurers and insureds.
A. The Underlying Contract
The parties to the underlying investment contract should
consider the need for commercial and/or political risk insurance.
B. When Should Commercial Risk Insurance Coverage be
Considered?
Insurance coverage for the elements of commercial risk
should be addressed in the planning stage of an investment.
This is not a requirement of law, but of practicality. In principle,
insurers are prepared to issue coverage at any time. The most
fundamental axiom of the insurance business, however, is to in-
sure before a loss is sustained.
In some contracts, particularly with or within developing
countries, foreign investors specify that insurance of a certain
description will be procured. This is partly because local inves-
tors or governments might later object to the cost of insurance
or want to reduce the coverage below a level at which the foreign
investor or its lenders are comfortable.
In addition, some countries require that insurance be pur-
chased from local insurers. In China, for example, the joint ven-
ture law provides that "[t]he insurance appropriate to a joint
venture shall be furnished by Chinese insurance companies. '
Technically, only foreign investments structured as equity joint
141. China Joint Venture, supra note 15, at Art. 8.
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ventures are subject to this requirement. The government can
waive the requirement, and it appears that, in practice, the re-
quirement has been waived if the joint venture agreement per-
mits the purchase of foreign insurance.142 Many contracts with
or within developing countries include provisions that require
procurement of local goods and services.14 This requirement
could extend to the procurement of insurance.
Any explicit or likely requirement to buy local insurance
should surface in negotiations at the planning stage. Require-
ments for local procurement can often be waived in the contract
by the local participant and can usually be specifically waived by
the government. The investor's maximum leverage to obtain
such a waiver is in the planning stage, when the investment is
being negotiated.
1. Should the Contract Provide for Political Risk Insurance?
Whether the underlying contract should provide for the
procurement of political risk insurance is a more difficult issue.
As noted earlier, OPIC can insure investments only if its cover-
age is "additional""1 " to the investment. In most cases addition-
ality can be established if the investor registers its intention to
procure insurance. Additionality can also be demonstrated by a
provision in the underlying contract stating that the investment
cannot proceed without the procurement of political risk insur-
ance from OPIC, or, as an alternative, political risk insurance
acceptable to the investor.
Although private insurers impose no such registration re-
quirements, " 5 it is often prudent, as noted, to bind private in-
surance in the planning stage, and in the underlying contract.
Many investors are concerned, however, that an explicit provi-
sion for political risk insurance might be offensive to a host gov-
ernment and might make negotiations more difficult. This con-
cern is sometimes valid, although the experience of many
142. See S. Linn Williams, Protecting Investments in China, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, 431 (PLI 1985).
143. Sometimes this requirement is lifted to local goods and services that are com-
petitive in quality and price.
144. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
145. Insurance can be purchased whether or not it is additional to the investment.
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negotiators has been that most developing countries are rela-
tively sophisticated about the investor's need for such insurance.
It is often sufficient to explain that commercial lenders typically
require such insurance, at least on any funds they lend, and
often on the investor's equity as well.
In addition, a requirement under the older forms of OPIC's
bilateral agreements, was a specific approval" 6 of an investment
before it would issue insurance. The government of the develop-
ing country, therefore, might have specific notice of OPIC's cov-
erage, but it would not know the amount of such coverage. In
contrast, many private insurers do not want developing coun-
tries to know of the existence of the insurance, for the same rea-
sons that defense lawyers do not want a jury apprised of the
existence of insurance in liability cases. Indeed, many private in-
surers would consider it a violation of the insurance contract if
the insured advised the host government of the existence of cov-
erage. The most prudent approach is to check with the private
insurer during the planning stage and obtain the insurer's in-
structions on whether or not to provide for political risk insur-
ance in the underlying agreement.
C. Important Provisions
As noted earlier in the discussion of OPIC, the provisions of
the underlying contract can become crucial to the scope of the
insurance coverage. Political risk insurance does not cover losses
resulting from acts that the investor agreed to in its contract.
There are a number of provisions in underlying investment con-
tracts that have been important in disputes over the scope of
insurance coverage and therefore merit special consideration.
The following are some examples.
1. Force Majeure
The force majeure clause, at a minimum, should be drafted
in such a way that it does not excuse a claim that an ex-
propriatory act has occurred.147
146. This is called a Foreign Government Approval.
147. See supra note 18 for definition.
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2. Dispute Resolution
OPIC's insurance relating to the dispute resolution provi-
sion in certain instances underscores the importance of negotiat-
ing this provision. For example, if the investor agrees that dis-
putes are to be resolved by local courts, the investor will be
bound by the results of that process. An investor cannot agree to
such a dispute resolution procedure and then argue later that
the procedure itself is inherently unfair or partial.
3. Choice of Law
The choice of law provision can affect the substantive law
applied to an issue of coverage such as whether an expropriatory
act occurred. Applicable law in most insurance contracts is the
law of New York, England or a similar jurisdiction. Most of
these jurisdictions will not have direct authority on the law of
expropriations and would therefore apply international law in
the absence of a specific choice of law provision in the contract
relating to the determination of expropriation. If the underlying
contract applies local law to issues arising out of that contract, a
tribunal would probably respect that choice of law and evaluate
the issue of whether an expropriatory act had occurred by refer-
ence, first, to local law. 148 Local law must also meet standards
imposed by international law.149 However, if the taking has been
accomplished in a manner in accordance with local law, and if
the local law meets the threshold requirements of international
law, no expropriatory act might have occurred under the usual
definition of "expropriatory act" in an insurance contract.15
4. Minimizing Loss, Maximizing Recoveries
Insurance contracts typically require that the insured take
all necessary steps to minimize loss and maximize recoveries.
148. See, e.g., Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978) [hereinafter TOPCO]; CHITTARANGAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967).
149. TOPCO, supra note 148; Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, Am. Arb. Assoc. Case No. 16 10 0137 76 (1978) (Bergan, Arb.);
Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 35 INT'L L.
RPTS. 136 (1967).
150. See Sohn and Baxter, supra note 11.
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This clause can be construed to require invocation of judicial
and other remedies, which can be constrained by the dispute
resolution and choice of law clauses.
5. Start-up
In the drafting of many contracts, serious consideration
should be given to the definition of "start-up." From the stand-
point of the investor or lender, the start-up should be accom-
plished as quickly and automatically as possible. The start-up
stage can, however, last from months to years. The start-up gen-
erally implies operation at economically viable levels over a rea-
sonable period of time. For example, the start-up of a chemical
investment could be defined as the output of a certain volume
and quality of gas, as verified by an impartial third party. This
is particularly significant for so-called turnkey contracts, in
which the investor agrees to provide a fully operational facility.
The risk of operating the facility shifts to the new owners only
at the startup of operations. A government's questionable acts
toward the investment, therefore, might be deemed to be "com-
mercial," rather than "political," and therefore not covered by
most insurance contracts, if the start-up has not yet occurred.
D. Applications
The document that an insured executes at the planning
stage is usually an application for insurance, not an insurance
contract. Often, these applications are entered into under great
time pressures, and the insured or its broker must mobilize a
number of coinsurers in order to obtain the necessary level and
type of coverage.
1. Obligations of the Prospective Insured
Misstatements or omissions in applications have been the
subject of a number of disputes between insureds and insurers.
In view of the substantial losses that insurers could incur as a
result of risk analysis based upon incorrect facts, the law of most
jurisdictions imposes an obligation upon prospective insureds to
disclose accurately and completely information that is material
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to the issuance of an insurance contract.15' If they do not do so,
the contract can be declared void ab initio.
Under New York law, for example, which is commonly ap-
plied in insurance contracts, there are two grounds for cancella-
tion of insurance contracts by insurers: misrepresentation of ma-
terial facts and concealment of material facts. Under most
circumstances, New York law imposes upon a prospective in-
sured a duty to disclose to the insurer all facts that are material
to the issuance of an insurance policy. 5 ' New York law generally
does not impose upon insurers a duty to investigate the accuracy
of an insured's representations. 153 Only if an insurer has deliber-
ately disregarded notice of an insured's misrepresentations will
it be deemed to have waived its right to cancel an insurance con-
tract because of misrepresentation or concealment of material
facts.'54
Materiality is often defined by statute 5 but, under most
common law definitions, a material fact is one that induces ac-
tion that the insurer might otherwise not have taken if it had
known the true facts. 56 Modern analysis focuses upon the free-
dom of choice of the insurer. In order to weigh properly the risks
and benefits associated with the transaction and thereby to
make a correct choice, full and accurate disclosure of all infor-
mation related to the risks is required. A potential insured who
misrepresents or conceals facts skews the insurer's analysis and
deprives the insurer of its freedom of choice on whether to in-
sure the transaction and on what premium to charge. 57
In order to prove that it might not have entered into a
transaction had it been aware of all the facts, an insurer can
show that its practice is not to enter into such contracts when
such risks are involved. Affidavits and testimony of insurance of-
151. See, e.g., note 152, infra.
152. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3105 (McKinney's 1985).
153. See Geer v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 125 (1937); American General
Life Ins. Co. v. Dos Santos, 457 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1st Dep't 1983); Kantor v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 227 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dep't 1962).
154. See Orent v. Equitable Life Ins. Society, 51 N.Y.S.2d 115 (2d Dep't 1944).
155. See supra note 152.
156. See L. Smirlock Realty Corp. v. Title Guarantee Co., 421 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d
Dep't 1979).
157. See also Leamy v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 271, 383 N.Y.S.2d 564,
347 N.E.2d 889 (1976).
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ficers have been sufficient to prove such a practice, '58 which can
also be demonstrated by reference to underlying rules and
manuals. 159 Because each insurer is free to accept or reject
whatever risks it chooses, the reasonableness of an insurer's un-
derwriting policies ordinarily cannot be challenged.' 60
Misrepresented facts can be material even though they are
not the only facts involved in the insurer's decision to enter into
a contract,'"' and even though they are not the cause of a loss.'62
It is not necessary for the insurer to prove fraudulent intent by
the insured in order to maintain an action for misrepresentation.
Even "innocent" misrepresentation, if material, is a sufficient
ground for cancellation.'6 3
An action for concealment in contract requires proof of
fraudulent intent. It is fraudulent for an insured to fail to dis-
close facts that it knows would be material to the insurer in act-
ing upon the application." The standard of materiality is gener-
ally the same as in misrepresentation. 6 5
The application can influence whether an omission of a ma-
terial fact constitutes a "concealment" or a "misrepresentation."
Under New York law, for example, this would depend upon
whether an insurer made an inquiry relating to the undisclosed
fact. The application form constitutes such an inquiry. If no in-
quiry is made, omission of a material fact constitutes conceal-
ment only if the insured knows that such a fact is material. For
example, once an inquiry is made, in the application, omission or
misrepresentation of a material fact constitutes a misrepresenta-
tion, regardless of the insured's knowledge that such fact is
material. 6 '
158. See Meyers v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 401 N.Y.S.2d 325 (3d Dep't
1978); But see Witter v. IDS Insurance Co., 466 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't 1983) (unsup-
ported assertions are not sufficient).
159. See Friedman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 589 F.Supp. 1017
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
160. See Fernandez v. Windsor Life Ins. Co. of America, 83 Misc.2d 301, 372,
N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1975).
161. See Geer v. Union Mutual Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 261, 7 N.E.2d 125 (1973).
162. See Sebring v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 382 (1931).
163. See Anderson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 193 N.E. 181 (1934).
164. See Sebring v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 382 (1931).
165. See, e.g., L. Smirlock v. Title Guarantee Co., 421 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1979).
166. See VanderVeer v. Continental Casualty Co., 34 N.Y.2d 50, 356 N.Y.S.2d 13
(1974).
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2. Provisions In Applications
An investor should give very careful attention to an applica-
tion for insurance and perhaps even seek outside advice from a
broker or experienced lawyer. The application usually requests
basic information about the investment. It also requests infor-
mation about the management of the investment, the relation-
ship of the investment and the investor to the host government,
and the dependence of the investment on the investor.1 1 7 The
following are some of the typical provisions in applications that
have been the subject of disputes between insureds and insurers.
a. Accounting method
Most applications require a statement of the accounting
method used by the insured with respect to the investment. It is
crucial to the insurer that it be able to obtain adequate salvage
of any investment on which it pays a claim and to which it is
thereby subrogated. This requires that the same accounting
method be used to determine the payment of claims and the val-
uation of the investment in the host country. However, some-
times the methods investors employ to account for the invest-
ment in the host country differ from those used to account for
the investment in the home country. In fact, generally accepted
accounting principles might even require such differing
treatment.
It is prudent for the applicant to disclose any such differ-
ences in the application. In the event of a dispute, particularly
one involving possible expropriation, the insurer's salvage will be
substantially affected by the valuation applied to the investment
in the host country. If the insured expects the insurer to pay a
claim based upon the value of that investment in the United
States, the insurer has a right to expect that the value of the
investment in the United States will not differ substantially
from the value of the investment in the host country. Otherwise,
the insurer's salvage rights will be adversely affected without its
knowledge or approval.
167. For example, this could occur because of licensed technology.
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b. Items insured
Most applications require a comprehensive description and
listing of the items to be insured. In general, property and casu-
alty insurers cover only tangible, physical assets, and they can
reasonably expect an insured to state the nature of its assets ac-
curately in its application. Political risk insurers sometimes in-
sure nontangible assets such as receivables. They rarely extend
coverage, however, substantially beyond the stated value of
fixed, tangible assets.
c. "Catch-all" question
Most applications contain a "catch-all" question that re-
quests information on any matters that might affect coverage or
give rise to a claim. An insured is not required to speculate in
answering such an inquiry. On the other hand, if the insured has
actual knowledge of a dispute or potential dispute that might
affect its coverage, it withholds that information from the in-
surer at risk of cancellation. Political risk insurers are supposed
to take risks and to have knowledge of local political conditions.
However, insurers may not be aware of disputes or threats that
specifically affect an investor or investment, and therefore the
investor must bring these to the attention of the insurer in the
application. 168
d. OPIC's application
OPIC's application plays an additional role. It is important
for OPIC to obtain from the investor certain information about
statutory eligibility requirements, such as so-called "United
States effects." 169 Obtaining this data also depends substantially
upon the cooperation of the host government and can be pro-
vided for in the underlying contract.
168. See, e.g., Application for Expropriation Insurance (Permanent Investments) of
the National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa.
169. For example, the investment can not result in a significant net loss of U.S. jobs.
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E. Insurance Contracts
Insurance contracts can, of course, vary considerably. For
example, although the definitions of "expropriatory act" in a
sample of insurance contracts issued by OPIC, AIG and Lloyds
are basically the same, there are differences that might be cru-
cial, given the variety of situations in which disputes over the
existence of an "expropriatory act" can arise.
1. Negotiating Insurance Contracts
Private insurers are the most flexible in negotiating con-
tracts, even though they work from forms. They have no policy
goals to uphold. Contracts tend, therefore, to be relatively less
complicated.
The investor has, at least in principle, some flexibility to ne-
gotiate its contract with MIGA. Generally, MIGA works from
form contracts. 170 At the outset, however, the MIGA Convention
implied that MIGA should be prepared to negotiate important
terms of coverage.
OPIC prepared and promulgated simplified forms of con-
tracts that are used for nonspecialized coverage.1 71 The contracts
were intended to simplify, not change, the previous contracts.
OPIC's policies for interpreting the contracts and managing the
claims, therefore, have not changed.17 2 It is common for OPIC
contracts to be modified to address special circumstances of the
investment, or special concerns of the investor or OPIC.
2. Most Important Provisions
Among the most important provisions of the typical insur-
ance contracts are the following:
a. Definition of "expropriatory act"
The definitions in various contracts are more alike than dif-
ferent, although there can be some important variations. The
wording of one provision might be construed to imply that any
170. See MIGA Standard Contract reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1233 (1989).
171. OPIC 12-85 Contract, supra note 49.
172. Id.
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taking, not just an unlawful expropriatory taking, would be cov-
ered. Some provisions require total, not partial, takings. Under
OPIC's contract, for example, an investor cannot have a claim
paid and retain ownership of the underlying investment. Pay-
ment of the claim entitles OPIC to be subrogated to all of the
investor's rights. By contrast, private insurers can be more flexi-
ble with respect to partial takings.
b. Waiting period
The "waiting period" is the time that must elapse between
the date of the expropriatory act or loss and the time when it
may be considered for compensation under the insurance con-
tract. This is usually six to twelve months from the date of loss,
although it can vary. The provision concerning the waiting pe-
riod is important for two reasons. First, an insurer can avoid
payment of a claim if the investor is restored its rights before
the end of the waiting period. Second, the insured is usually
subject to special obligations to the insurer to protect the invest-
ment during the waiting period. It is prudent for the insured to
seek to provide a basis for "restoration" and to clarify its rights
and obligations during this period. It is prudent in any event for
the insured to regularly discuss its handling of the investment
during this period with the insurer and, if possible, to obtain the
insurer's approval of any actions or omissions.
c. Notices
An insurer is entitled to receive notice of the expropriatory
act in accordance with the insurance contract. It is to the in-
sured's advantage to give such notice sooner rather than later,
not only because it is contractually required to do so, but also
because the insurer might play a useful role in resolving any
dispute.
d. Warranties
The insured is required in most insurance contracts to give
certain covenants and warranties. The most common and impor-
tant of these are that:
1. No material information has been withheld;
2. The insured will use all reasonable measures to prevent or
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minimize loss;
3. The insured will cooperate with the insurers;
4. The insured will take all reasonable steps, before and after
payment by the insurers of any loss, to effect recoveries of the
investment;
5. The insured has or will have obtained all necessary authoriza-
tions and licenses and will renew them in accordance with the
law;
6. The insured will preserve all remedies in the event of any
disputes;
7. The insured has complied with and will continue to comply
with laws of the host country; and
8. The uninsured percentage of loss will remain uninsured.
In addition, under OPIC's contracts, the insured agrees that
the insured and the investment will remain eligible for OPIC's
assistance throughout the period of insurance. 1
71
e. "Sue and Labor" doctrine
As noted, a common provision in insurance contracts is that
the insured will take all reasonable steps to minimize loss or to
preserve the investment, or provisions to a similar effect. This is
often a cause of dispute between insureds and their insurers.
Such a provision reflects the general requirements of what is
called the "sue and labor" doctrine," 4 which might be imposed
upon the insured to some degree even in the absence of such a
provision. Such provisions, however, can vary considerably from
contract to contract, and the specific wording of the provision
has often been crucial to the existence of coverage in the event
of a dispute. 17 5
f. Definition and computation of loss
This is one of the most negotiated provisions in private in-
surance contracts, and one that has been the focal point of a
number of disputes between insurers and the insured. Even if an
173. OPIC 12-85, supra note 49 at Arts. 9.01(0), 9.01(2), 9.01(3).
174. See, e.g., Slay Warehousing Company, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Company, 471
F.2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1973); Southern California Edison Co. v. Harbor Insurance Co., 148
Cal. Rptr. 106 (1978); 18 CROUNCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 74:642, at 573-74 (1968).
175. OPIC 12-85 Contract, supra note 49 at Art. 9.01(a).
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insurer is liable, the question of the extent of its liability is obvi-
ously of great importance. The definition and computation of
loss can be described specifically, as it is in OPIC's contract," 6
or it can be described briefly by reference to a particular set of
financial statements, as is sometimes the case in private con-
tracts. A number of brokers advocate such a reference to finan-
cial statements, perhaps as calculated under generally accepted
accounting principles consistently applied in the United States
as the measure of loss. Most insurers resist this definition be-
cause, in their view, such financial statements do not always re-
present an accurate valuation of the investment.
g. Exclusions
Insurance contracts provide that coverage is excluded under
certain conditions, the most common and important of which in-
clude the following:
1. Wrongful or dishonest acts or omissions of the insured;
2. Failure of the insured to take reasonable measures to prevent
an expropriatory act;
3. Material breach or inaccuracy of any representation or
warranty;
4. Failure to perform or fulfill any covenant;
5. Failure to obtain authorizations and permits; and
6. Destruction or physical damage to the property, except by act
of the host government.
In addition, private political risk contracts typically exclude
losses caused by or resulting from war.1 77 OPIC's contracts also
require that the insured caused the investment to be made and
operated in accordance with the statements made to OPIC, and
that the insured and its investment will remain eligible under
OPIC's authorizing statute.
176. OPIC 12-85 Contract, supra note 49 at Art. 5.
177. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 126, at 22. AIG's and Lloyds' war exclusion provi-
sions exclude only changes resulting from wars involving the United States, the United
Kingdom, the old Soviet Union, France or China, wars between the country of the in-
sured and the host country, and wars involving nuclear or thermonuclear devices.
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h. Recoveries
Insurance contracts typically provide for distribution of re-
coveries for loss. Typically, recoveries before the payment of a
claim can be retained by the insured and constitute a reduction
of loss. Recoveries after the end of the payment of a claim are
often shared by the insurer and the insured. Under one typical
private insurance contract, recoveries occurring after payment of
loss are shared between the insurer and the insured in the pro-
portion to which they shared the loss. However, the recoveries
provision should also indicate how recoveries should be shared if
they are received after the end of the waiting period but before
the payment of a claim; for example, recoveries during an arbi-
tration between the insurer and the insured over the issue of
coverage, occurring after the end of the waiting period.
IX. CONCLUSION
In addition to a general analysis of the nature of political
risks, this article has described programs currently available for
managing them.
Although programs like OPIC and MIGA are always under
some domestic political strain, there is no reason to believe that
there will be a radical change in this decade in the prevailing
view that governments, individually and collectively, have policy
interests in stable foreign investment in developing countries. It
is also likely that the private reinsurance market will recover in
this decade, following a period of stable claims, and the private
insurers will continue to generate creative ways to manage polit-
ical risks.
It is not yet clear what the end of this century and the be-
ginning of the next portend for foreign investment in developing
countries. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War may bring
greater political stability and opportunity for economic develop-
ment, for there are no remaining international ideologies that
automatically create political risks for foreign investment. The
portion of gross domestic product that went into arms in for-
merly communist countries can go into commercial develop-
ment, but ironically, as the former communist and developing
countries increasingly embrace capitalism, the world's demand
for capital has substantially outstripped its ability to create cap-
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ital, and developing countries are competing with one another
for foreign capital. Thus, there will be a demand for foreign in-
vestment for some time to come.
On the other hand, there will surely be constraints. As for-
mer Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Tip
O'Neill said (borrowing, I think, from some Victorian politician),
"all politics is local;" and local political risks will outlast com-
munism just as assuredly as they predated it. Also, and again
ironically, as developing countries increasingly embrace open
market economics, the strains on open markets in industrialized
countries are as great as they have been in the last sixty years.
Given the right policies and a bit of luck, other elements
may emerge in this decade that can further improve the climate
for foreign investment. Many companies are becoming more sen-
sitive in their foreign investments, thereby defusing local resent-
ments natural to any foreign presence. More open markets in
developing countries can create classes of entrepreneurs and
capitalists that will make it difficult for local governments to re-
vert.to state intervention. EC-92, NAFTA and the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations all imply that the future might in-
clude greater multilateral protection of foreign investment.
Ultimately, Polonius probably envisaged the only way to
avoid political risk: "Neither a borrower nor a lender be. ' 17 8 So
long as there are borrowers and lenders (remember that Polo-
nius did not live to the end of the play), there will be political
risk to analyze, allocate and manage.
178. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 3.
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